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This paper reports briefly on some of the results from a survey of academics who have 
written about the theory of rational addiction. The topic is important in itself because 
if the literature is viewed by its participants as an intellectual game, then policy makers 
should be aware of this so as not to derive actual policy from toy models. More 
generally, the answers shed light on the nature of economics and how many 
economists think about model building, evidence requirements and the policy 
relevance of their work. A majority of the respondents believe the literature is a 
success story that demonstrates the power of economic reasoning.  At the same time 
they also believe the empirical evidence to be weak, and they disagree both on the type 
of evidence that would validate the theory and the policy implications. Taken together 
this points to an interesting gap. On the one hand most of the respondents claim that 
the theory has valuable real-world implications. On the other hand they do not believe 




Rational addiction theory, survey of opinions of economists, disagreement on evidence 
criteria and interpretation of evidence. 
  11 INTRODUCTION 
It has been argued that rational addiction theory is a success story that demonstrates 
the power of applying economic analysis to topics that used to be viewed as outside 
the realm of economics. In the words of Orphanides and Zervos (1998) the literature 
initiated by Becker and Murphy (1988) shows that “harmful addictive behaviour is 
largely consistent with the standard axioms of rational, forward looking utility 
maximization and should no longer be considered a challenge to standard economic 
analysis.” In contrast to this, it has also been claimed that rational addiction theory is 
“absurd”, that “the silliness of theories such as rational addiction raises the question of 
how it can be taken seriously” and that the literature is more an intellectual “game” 
than a true effort to understand addiction (Rogeberg 2004).  
 
Given the importance of explaining addiction as a phenomenon in itself, and as a case 
study of economic imperialism in general, it was decided to investigate how 
economists working within this area viewed their work and the literature. This is 
important because if the literature really is viewed by its participants as an intellectual 
game, then policy makers should be aware of this so as not to derive actual policy 
from toy models. More generally, the answers shed light on the nature of economics 
and how many economists think about model building, evidence requirements and the 
policy relevance of their work. 
 
To examine what the field itself thinks about rational addiction theory, we conducted a 
survey among authors who had published one or more articles about rational 
addiction. Three main topics are covered. First, do economists take rational addiction 
seriously as plausible theory of addiction? Second, do they agree on the kind of 
  2evidence that is relevant to test the theory and the extent to which the rational 
addiction literature provide this evidence? Third, what, if any, implications do they 
believe the theory has?  
 
Previous research on the opinions of economists has already established that there is 
significant normative and positive disagreement on many economic issues (Alston 
1992, Davis 1997, Frey 1992). It also seems that ideology is not the only or major 
driving force behind these disagreements (Caplan 2002, Mayer 2001). No previous 
survey has been conducted on the topic of rational addiction, but there is some 
relevant related research. For instance, Goldfarb et al (2001) have shown that theories 
of addiction may be underdetermined in the sense that existing data may not be 
sufficient to distinguish between competing theories. Also, Yuengert (2006) has 
demonstrated that multiple research goals can lead to different evaluations of rational 
addiction theory. Hence, the contribution of the current survey is not mainly to argue 
that there is disagreement or express surprise at the fact that there seems to be a 
tendency to arrive at different conclusions when faced with the same evidence. 
Instead, and in contrast to previous surveys of economists, the current survey is 
limited to rational addiction and this allows it to focuses explicitly on the links 
between overall views of the literature, evidence requirements and policy implications. 
By focusing on one topic and combining and contrasting the answers in these three 
categories it becomes possible not only to discover disagreements, but to reveal 
puzzling internal tensions. For instance, one of the major results from the survey is the 
puzzling finding that the theory of rational addiction represents a success story with 
quite strong implications, while at the same time it is admitted that the empirical 
evidence is often very weak.  
  3 
2 METHOD 
The survey was limited to researchers who had published articles with the phrase 
"rational addiction" in the title, as a keyword or in the abstract of the article. Working 
papers, books and publications in languages other than English were excluded. In 
order to create a list of the most important papers and authors, we created a database 
with the top 200 references from google.scholar using the search phrase "rational 
addiction" and combined this with the results from searches in EconLit, ISI Web of 
Science and PubMed using the phrase "Rational Addiction." In the end, these searches 
yielded a list of 111 articles with 156 authors or co-authors. 
 
Both e-mail and regular mail was used to make the selected sample aware of the 
survey. 34 authors were lost because of incomplete contact information. This means 
that 122 were invited to participate in the survey. 64 of these responded by answering 
our questions (52%). The survey consisted of 25 questions and most of these were in 
the form of statements to which respondents indicated their extent of 
agreement/disagreement a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 was “I completely disagree” and 
5 was “I completely agree.”  
 
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
It has been argued that “Economics has increasingly become an intellectual game 
played for its own sake and not for its practical consequences for understanding the 
economic world” (Blaug 1998).  This may be true, but from the survey it seems clear 
that the sentiment is not shared by many economists. Few -  but not insignificantly so - 
agreed to the statement that rational addiction theories is part of an intellectual game 
  4with no practical significance (17%). Instead, a large majority of the respondents, 
72%, believed that rational addiction theory “illustrates the power of economic 
analysis.“ This is comforting in the sense that it indicates that the participants really do 
believe in their work as having importance beyond getting papers published. 
 
However, for those who argue that rational addiction theories are patently absurd, the 
dominant belief that the theory illustrates the power of economic analysis may be 
more unsettling than comforting. In order for a theory to be powerful it should ideally 
have a solid empirical foundation and important implications. Unless these conditions 
are satisfied, the strong belief in the theory may be unsettling as a sign of ideological 
arrogance in the face of empirical facts. For this reason it is interesting to examine 
exactly what it is that makes the respondents believe the theory and which 
implications they believe it has.   
 
Testing a theory requires consensus on the kind of evidence that is relevant and the 
interpretation of that evidence. There are many possible model selection criteria 
(Goldfarb 2001, Yuengert 2006), but the rational addiction literature has typically 
focused on whether the theory is consistent with the data on the demand for drugs and 
price changes. There seems to be a general consensus about the relevance of this type 
of evidence (see Table 1). For instance, a large majority agreed that the theory should 
be consistent with macro-level evidence on the demand of addictive goods (74%). 
Interestingly, the kind of evidence believed to be most relevant, was also the area in 
which many respondents believed the data gave the weak support to the theory. Only 
27% agreed that the theory was consistent with the macro-evidence on elasticities and 
consumption patterns. 
  5Table 1: Evidence relating to theory 
  
 






  Yes, the data 
indicate that 
the theory 
really is … 
 








… the actual beliefs of real consumers or consistent 
with what is known about such physical and other 




… data on the market demand for addictive goods 





There was less agreement on the relevance of evidence at the individual level about 
how people actually make decisions. A majority, 57%, believed the theory should be 
consistent with evidence of this kind, but 20% disagreed. To some extent this reflects 
the attitude that all that matters is whether the model acts “as-if” it is compatible with 
macro implications that comes out of the model as opposed to the behavioural 
assumptions that goes into the model.  
 
As for the assumptions that go into that model, there was, surprisingly, no general 
consensus on whether rational addiction theory should be based on the standard 
axioms of economic choice theory. The contribution by Becker and Murphy (1988) 
claims to be an extension of this framework, but the respondents are divided about 
whether this is how we should model addiction. Part of the reason for this may be that 
interpretations of standard theory differ. For instance, following Becker and Murphy 
(1988) the standard approach often employs exponential discounting. Other 
  6contributions emphasise hyperbolic discounting, weakness of will or related 
mechanisms that can create time inconsistent behaviour (Ainslie 1991; Loewenstein 
1999). One might argue that the precise functional form of time preferences is not an 
essential axiom of the standard rational choice frame, but since opinions on this differ, 
the respondents also differ in their answers. 
 
One of the questions that divided the field most was whether the theory of rational 
addiction should be interpreted as an “as-if” theory. The rational addiction literature 
has often been criticised for making very strong assumptions about the rationality of 
the individuals who engage in substance abuse. Typically the users are not only seen 
as capable of responding to incentives, but being able to create a long term plan of 
how much drugs to use taking into account how the use will affect their future desire 
to use drugs (i.e., rational taste planning). When confronted with the criticism that 
many substance users seem not to have such a plan for their career, the usual defense 
is Friedeman’s (1953) “as-if” justification: All that matters is whether the agents act as 
if their behaviour is determined by a rational plan of how much to consume at various 
points in time, not whether the addicts actually make a rational plan. 38% of the 
respondents in the survey agreed with this “as-if” argument, while 43% disagreed. 
Moreover, even those who agreed that an “as-if” model was enough for the theory to 
be relevant, did not believe that consumers of addictive goods actually behave “as-if” 
the models were correct. Only 27% of the sample agreed that the consumers behave 
“as-if” the model was correct. 
 
  7Table 2: Economists’ opinions on rational addiction and implications 
The Rational Addiction literature …  Disagree  Neutral  Agree 
 
… provides insights into how addicts choose that are 
relevant for psychologists and treatment 
professionals   42 %  19 %  39 % 
 
... contains insights on the welfare consequences of 
addictive goods and public policies towards these   22 %  22 %  56 % 
 
… provides evidence that addictions are actually a 
sequence of rational choices maximising 
welfare/utility   53 %  20 %  27 % 
 
... provides useful tools for predicting how addicts in 
the aggregate will respond to incentives   25 %  30 %  44 % 
 
... extends and enriches consumer theory   16 %  11 %  73 % 
 
 
Given the hesitation to agree that the theory is empirically verified, one might expect 
similar hesitation about the insights the theory has to offer or its usefulness in policy 
analysis (Table 2). In fact, the respondents split into two roughly equal and opposing 
factions when asked whether the rational addiction literature provided insight that 
were relevant for how to treat addictions: 39% agreed and 42% disagreed. To some 
extent one might expect that those who are reluctant to draw treatment implications 
from the theory are the same individuals who only take the theory as an “as-if” theory 
since they focus more on predictive success than explanatory success. However, a 
cross-tabulation of the answers show that almost half of the “as-if” adherents also 
argued that the rational addiction literature had implications for treatment of addicts.  
 
The same puzzling gap between the empirical evidence behind the theory and claims 
about the theories insights can be seen when the respondents are asked about aggregate 
policy implications. A majority agree that the theory gives insight into the welfare 
  8consequences of addictive goods (56%) at the same time that they do not believe one 
of its major assumptions - that addicts rationally choose an optimal and welfare 
maximizing path of consumption over time (27% agreed with this). Similarly, while 
agreeing that the empirical basis was weak, 73% agreed that the literature extends and 
enriches consumer theory.  
 
4 CONCLUSION 
There are at least two main possible interpretations of the results from this survey. The 
charitable interpretation is that although the participants judge the theory to be 
empirically shaky, what is believed to be true yields enough insight to judge the 
literature as an overall success. The less charitable interpretation would be to argue 
that the survey reveals a puzzling belief that theories can be used to derive important 
and valid policy implications even when its assumptions are not believed and the 
theory is admitted to have weak empirical support. To distinguish between these two 
interpretations would require a more subjective assessment the value of the insights 
and whether they are enough to qualify as a success story. This survey has only 
identified what may be an interesting gap and as such it only constitutes the raw 





The survey was funded by the Health Economics Research Programme (HERO) at the 
University of Oslo and it was created and conducted in cooperation with Ole Jørgen 
Røgeberg. 
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